waiting for Weber
Warning: political post ahead!
Sociologist Max Weber defined "the state" as a political entity with a monopoly on violence within its territory. In trying to understand the current catastrophe unfolding in Lebanon/Gaza, I keep coming back to Weber. To me, it seems that the conflict is less about Israel vs. Arabs or Iran vs. the West, and more about the the future role of non-state actors in international politics.
Bear with me. For the last 2 decades, Hizballah has been a largely autonomous political organization operating out of southern Lebanon. It has its own social programs, funding sources, support base, and military forces. It has far greater capabilities than the average political party but a lower international profile than a state. This gives it enormous freedom of action. As long they kept the focus domestic, this was not necessarily a bad thing.
However, as we're now observing, freedom of action can also make for very fluid and unstable international politics. Not only can Hizballah operate largely unconstrained in pursuing its own interests; it is also available as a tool for other states, like Syria and Iran. They can advance their aspirations indirectly, through Hizballah, while maintaining a facade of international legitimacy.
I'm not suggesting that these states masterminded the recent seizures of Israeli soldiers. I think Hizballah comes up with and executes its own plans. However, I'd be very surprised if Hizballah didn't get a green light from Damascus and Tehran before launching these actions. From the Syrian perspective, the current situation is the best of all possible worlds: Israel gets challenged, Lebanon weakened, Syria's regional importance increases, both politically and as a tourist destination, it gets to thumb its nose at the US, and increase domestic cohesion by showing its anti-Israel credentials and expressing verbal support for Hizballah. And all for the small price of a few thousand Lebanese refugees.
If I'm right, these are obviously very dirty, destabilizing international politics. My argument is that countries in the region need to start acting like responsible states and eliminate the back channels for engaging in political violence. The non-state actors need to disarm and integrate into regular national politics. If Hamas wants to get treated like a state, it has to act like one: no more border incursions and kidnappings.
However, the disempowering of regional non-state actors can not occur outside of larger negotiations on the Israel-Palestine question. Without Israeli concessions, eliminating some of the reasons for these militant groups' existence, they can not be integrated into mainstream politics. Contrary to Bush's expectations, they can't be eliminated through a pure display of force. Sure, it sounds compelling: pound them until they disappear. But this policy ignores the fact that brutality--especially when the vast majority of its victims are civilian--just breeds more resistance. Thus the current consolidation of Lebanese support for Hizballah.
So, is there any prospect for conflict resolution? I'm not optimistic. One of the biggest impediments is the lack of an honest broker for negotiations. The UN lacks teeth, Israel will only engage if the US is involved, and the US's (lack of) positive action in the current crisis has alienated Arab public opinion. It's too bad; if we'd forced Israel to exercise more restraint, there might have been grounds for discussion.
But instead, I think Israel has done exactly what it promised a week ago: set Lebanon back 20 years. Back to bombed out cities, Israeli occupation, and a reputation for internal instability. Two decades of work--for nothing. And the US has simply sat back and watched.
Comment away!
Sociologist Max Weber defined "the state" as a political entity with a monopoly on violence within its territory. In trying to understand the current catastrophe unfolding in Lebanon/Gaza, I keep coming back to Weber. To me, it seems that the conflict is less about Israel vs. Arabs or Iran vs. the West, and more about the the future role of non-state actors in international politics.
Bear with me. For the last 2 decades, Hizballah has been a largely autonomous political organization operating out of southern Lebanon. It has its own social programs, funding sources, support base, and military forces. It has far greater capabilities than the average political party but a lower international profile than a state. This gives it enormous freedom of action. As long they kept the focus domestic, this was not necessarily a bad thing.
However, as we're now observing, freedom of action can also make for very fluid and unstable international politics. Not only can Hizballah operate largely unconstrained in pursuing its own interests; it is also available as a tool for other states, like Syria and Iran. They can advance their aspirations indirectly, through Hizballah, while maintaining a facade of international legitimacy.
I'm not suggesting that these states masterminded the recent seizures of Israeli soldiers. I think Hizballah comes up with and executes its own plans. However, I'd be very surprised if Hizballah didn't get a green light from Damascus and Tehran before launching these actions. From the Syrian perspective, the current situation is the best of all possible worlds: Israel gets challenged, Lebanon weakened, Syria's regional importance increases, both politically and as a tourist destination, it gets to thumb its nose at the US, and increase domestic cohesion by showing its anti-Israel credentials and expressing verbal support for Hizballah. And all for the small price of a few thousand Lebanese refugees.
If I'm right, these are obviously very dirty, destabilizing international politics. My argument is that countries in the region need to start acting like responsible states and eliminate the back channels for engaging in political violence. The non-state actors need to disarm and integrate into regular national politics. If Hamas wants to get treated like a state, it has to act like one: no more border incursions and kidnappings.
However, the disempowering of regional non-state actors can not occur outside of larger negotiations on the Israel-Palestine question. Without Israeli concessions, eliminating some of the reasons for these militant groups' existence, they can not be integrated into mainstream politics. Contrary to Bush's expectations, they can't be eliminated through a pure display of force. Sure, it sounds compelling: pound them until they disappear. But this policy ignores the fact that brutality--especially when the vast majority of its victims are civilian--just breeds more resistance. Thus the current consolidation of Lebanese support for Hizballah.
So, is there any prospect for conflict resolution? I'm not optimistic. One of the biggest impediments is the lack of an honest broker for negotiations. The UN lacks teeth, Israel will only engage if the US is involved, and the US's (lack of) positive action in the current crisis has alienated Arab public opinion. It's too bad; if we'd forced Israel to exercise more restraint, there might have been grounds for discussion.
But instead, I think Israel has done exactly what it promised a week ago: set Lebanon back 20 years. Back to bombed out cities, Israeli occupation, and a reputation for internal instability. Two decades of work--for nothing. And the US has simply sat back and watched.
Comment away!
posted by Emily at 6:04 PM
4 Comments:
But if we take Weber's thin definition of the state seriously, that it's about having a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, the question is how one group or individuals (be it a relatively autonomous group or an internationally recognized government, i.e. a bureaucracy or something like it) constitutes their use of violence as legitimate. I presume this is constrained to a specific geographic location.
But isn't this precisely what Hizballah (and Isreal for that matter) is doing at the expense of not just the Lebanese people but the Lebanese government? They are both fighting to establish themselves as the sole group who can legitimately use force in a particular set of geographic locations.
While I agree that we should prefer that groups like Hamas and Hizballah integrate themselves into existing state apparatuses, I'm just saying that if we take Weber seriously through this, then we shouldn't really be that surprised that it is precisely through violence that Hizballah ultimately seeks to establish itself as a state, rather then being able to rest on their other state-like capacities (like domestic services).
As a sometime medievalist, I am also pessimistic. From my (completely inexpert) viewpoint, the state (after Rome, in the West) was something of an achievement-- disallowing and/or coopting the war-lordism that chivalry was, under its ideology (the church's attempt at taiming it). Possibly the state only actually came together with modern weaponry, the more impressive forms of which small actors could not afford. But it now turns out that small actors have plenty of access to sufficient force to get in the game, from terror through weapons that are destructive enough to be effective--with the added magnifier of modern communications, useful in associating the independent actors with legitimizing, unifying ideologies (another pillar of statehood).
So... given the incentives to fund said actors and for them to stay independent, what kind of incentives can possibly be created for them to accede to legitimacy and responsibility? Somehow the 56-year-old assumption that the Palestinians will just dry up and blow away, following their forceful ejection from the state system, and the US and Israeli domination of the system itself, do not seem like promising foundations.
Can anyone be more optimistic?
K. H.
What's funny to me is that the actions of these non-state political entities and the way you talk about them sounds exactly like the way I talk about my teens at camp. hehe. I particularly like the comment...
If Hamas wants to get treated like a state, it has to act like one: no more border incursions and kidnappings.
... which could so easily be translated as...
If Joey Joe Joe wants to get treated like an adult, he has to act like one: no more snide comments and loud farts before bedtime.
It's like you're at summer camp and the counselors are Lebanon and Syria, Hezbollah are the rowdy teens, and Israel and Bush are the divorced parents. Yes, yes I understand it perfectly. Hooray international politics.
oh and sorry I missed you on the phone the other day. I'd love to chat sometime soon. Take care.
jules--love it! I think I might case Syria as the rowdy teen and Iran and the US as the divorced parents, but the family metaphor has DEFINITE potential.
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